For centuries, people have built their livelihoods around the assumption that the sea, while unpredictable, was broadly knowable. Fishermen learned the grounds where particular species could be found and communities developed around productive waters. Governments established rules around the resources that occurred within their jurisdictions and scientists built increasingly sophisticated methods for estimating the abundance of fish. Over time, an elaborate system emerged for managing a renewable resource whose location, productivity and behaviour were assumed to be sufficiently stable.

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That assumption was never entirely true. The ocean has always been variable. Fish have always moved, ecosystems have always fluctuated, and fishermen have always adapted to conditions that scientists and governments could not fully predict. What has changed is the scale, speed and interconnectedness of those changes, and with them the consequences of trying to manage a dynamic biological system through institutions and infrastructure designed around historical patterns.

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The North Sea offers an instructive example. During the 1980s, the ecosystem underwent a major shift associated with changes in large-scale hydro-meteorological conditions. The shift was visible across multiple levels of the ecosystem, from plankton communities and other lower trophic organisms through to fish populations. The precise timing differed between species and indicators, but the evidence points to a system-wide change rather than an isolated fluctuation in an individual stock.

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This distinction matters because fisheries are the economic expression of the ecosystems that produce them. Changes in temperature, circulation and other environmental conditions can reshape plankton communities and prey availability, which influence the growth, survival and distribution of commercially important species and when they are available to fleets. The fishery is therefore not a fixed object sitting inside an otherwise stable environment. It is the visible economic consequence of a much larger biological system.

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A shift in where fish are found changes can justify decisions for vessels to travel further, adapt their target species or follow the fish into different seasons. Those changes ripple through the supply chain, affecting how much fish reaches processors and buyers, what it costs, and whether fishing communities can remain economically viable. At the end of the chain, less predictable supply can mean substitution between species, increased reliance on imports, and resulting higher prices for end consumers.

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This exposes a tension that is fundamental to modern fisheries management. The ocean's biological geography is mobile whilst its political geography is comparatively fixed. The creation of 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zones in the late 1970s provided an essential framework through which coastal states could exercise rights over marine resources within defined national waters. It gave coastal states defined rights over resources and provided a basis on which access, conservation and exploitation could be negotiated. Nothing about that framework requires fish stocks to remain stationary but it does mean that the management of a stock becomes considerably more complicated when its distribution changes materially over time. 

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The North Sea is not an isolated case. Across the wider North-East Atlantic, Mackerel and Norwegian spring-spawning herring are highly mobile stocks whose distributions have changed in response to environmental conditions, and those changes have contributed to persistent difficulties in reaching comprehensive agreements over their allocation among coastal states. The underlying issue is not simply that fish have crossed a national boundary. It is that allocations negotiated around historical distributions can become contested when the stock itself moves. A change in biological geography can therefore unsettle the economic and political balance on which an agreement was originally based.

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And although Fisheries management has always had to account for uncertainty in the size and productivity of stocks. When the location of a commercially important stock changes, the consequences extend beyond the stock assessment. They can alter where fleets operate, which ports receive landings, which countries bear the costs of conservation, and how the benefits of the resource are distributed. A change in the biological system can therefore destabilise arrangements that were designed to manage it, even when every institution involved continues to operate according to the rules it was given. If those changes cross national boundaries, it becomes a question of international governance, industrial planning and, ultimately, the security and cost of food supply. 

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How did we get here?

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For much of the twentieth century, the central challenge was to prevent overexploitation of resources that could be observed and assessed within relatively stable management frameworks. Scientific fisheries management developed increasingly sophisticated stock assessment methods whilst governments established quotas and licensing systems and International organisations coordinated assessments and negotiations. Fishing communities developed detailed knowledge of seasonal patterns, grounds and species behaviour. These institutions and practices were imperfect, but they created a degree of predictability around which an industry could organise itself.

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The difficulty is that predictability is an asset that institutions consume without realizing it. When a stock remains broadly within the same geographical range for decades, historical distribution becomes embedded in policy. Fleets, ports, processors, communities and international agreements all begin to organise around that pattern. Capital is committed, skills develop and supply chains take shape around where fish have historically been found.

 

​The longer the assumed pattern persists, the more expensive it becomes to question the assumptions beneath it.

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Climate change introduces a different operating environment. The distribution of marine species is changing in response to warming and other environmental drivers, and the changes are not uniform across species. The UK's own Fisheries Management Plans now explicitly recognise that changing temperature and salinity can alter the distribution of commercial fish species. An analysis of 50 abundant fish species in waters around the UK and Ireland found that 72% had responded to regional warming through changes in distribution or abundance. The same government analysis anticipates further changes in the suitability of UK waters for individual commercial species and northward shifts in habitat suitability for most of the species considered. 

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The consequence is when the location, timing and composition of catches become harder to anticipate, businesses further down the chain have less certainty about what will be available, when it will arrive and at what cost. In 2025, UK import prices for haddock rose by 47.4% with the attributed reasoning tied to lower global supply and resulting quota cuts in key fisheries. 

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​And in reality, fisheries managers have noticed this, but recognising a change and being institutionally capable of responding to it are different things.

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This is particularly evident in Europe and the North Atlantic, where fisheries management has developed through a dense network of national regulations, bilateral and multilateral agreements, quota allocations and shared scientific assessment processes. They provide stability precisely because they allow decisions to be made consistently over time. But a change in environmental conditions does not automatically update a management boundary. Evidence that a fishing ground is becoming less productive does not tell a fleet where productive grounds will emerge next. The information may exist somewhere within the system, but it is not necessarily assembled quickly enough, or in a form usable enough, to turn a changing condition into a changing decision. 

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This is not a universal description of fisheries governance. Different countries have developed very different management institutions, and some have substantially more adaptive systems or different approaches to integrating environmental information into fisheries decisions. The argument is that the increasing mobility of fish stocks is exposing a tension between relatively fixed institutional arrangements and a biological system that is becoming more dynamic. Fisheries managers understand that conditions are changing but it is whether the institutions, information systems and commercial tools surrounding them can translate that recognition into action quickly enough. 

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The technology exists. The intelligence gap remains. 

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The modern ocean economy contains extraordinary scientific and engineering capability. It has produced satellites capable of observing the Earth's surface at increasingly high resolution, sophisticated oceanographic models, vessel tracking systems, remote sensing technologies, marine monitoring programmes and enormous repositories of scientific and fisheries data.

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However the overwhelming articulated problem is most were developed to perform particular functions for particular institutions. Scientific models were built to answer scientific questions. Vessel tracking systems were built to monitor vessel activity. Regulatory databases were built to administer monitoring. Earth observation systems were built to observe the physical environment. Fisheries statistics were built to understand catches and stock dynamics. Each system can be extremely valuable within its intended purpose.

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The frustration and delays emerge with the reality that marine information is distributed across systems that were never designed to communicate with one another. Not surprising, each is designed to operate on different timescales, use different spatial frameworks and are often controlled by different organisations. We have accumulated an extraordinary amount of information about the ocean, yet answering a relatively simple operational question can still require a person to move between multiple systems, reconcile different datasets and interpret information that was never designed to be used together. The limitation is the friction involved in turning the data we already have into a coherent picture of what is happening, where it is happening and what it means for an actionable decision to be made. 

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The changing ocean is increasingly creating problems that sit between these purpose-built systems.

It requires systems that can integrate environmental conditions, vessel activity, fisher observations, scientific models and regulatory geography into a continuously evolving picture of what is happening at sea. Turning data into operational intelligence that recognizes timescales, resolution, and is adoptable by various end users will be the distinctive factor as the ocean becomes more economically contested.

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Fishing has always been an adaptive industry. What is becoming harder is adapting with sufficient information and speed. A skipper can respond to conditions on the water, but cannot easily see how those conditions are changing across a wider area, how other fleets are responding, or where the combination of environmental and regulatory pressures may push activity next. The industry has good systems for recording what has happened; it has far fewer tools for understanding what is changing now and what that change means for the decisions it needs to make.

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This matters because fishing is no longer operating in isolation from the rest of the ocean economy. Offshore wind, aquaculture, shipping, conservation and subsea infrastructure are increasing demands on marine space at the same time as environmental change is altering where fishing is commercially viable. Fishermen are being asked to operate in an environment that is becoming more dynamic, more contested and more interconnected, without a corresponding increase in the speed and quality of the information available to them.

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We argue that fishermen do not need to be told how to fish. It is that they need a better information environment in which to make the decisions they already know how to make. The next generation of fishing technology should not replace the knowledge accumulated on the water; it should give that knowledge greater reach. It should bring together environmental conditions, vessel activity, fisher observations, scientific models and regulatory constraints and translate them into operational intelligence that can be understood and acted upon by the people making decisions at sea and on shore. The competitive advantage will not come simply from collecting more data. It will come from making the data we already have useful for the people on the ocean at the speed at which the ocean is changing .

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“It’s not to give people fish. It’s not to teach them how to fish. It’s to build a new and better fishing industry.” - Bryan Drayton 

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How nation leaders are changing.

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Over the past two decades, Norway has become a clear example of adaptive change when it comes to managing fisheries. It has developed integrated, ecosystem-based ocean management plans covering all of its ocean areas. Its current framework provides an integrated, ecosystem-based management plan for all Norwegian ocean areas on a four-year cycle. The Norwegian Government explicitly recognises that climate change and rising ocean temperatures are already changing ecosystem conditions across its management areas; stating that climate change is associated with higher temperatures, more frequent marine heatwaves, acidification, oxygen depletion, changes in current patterns, productivity and species distribution. These changes have far-reaching implications for marine ecosystems and living resources, and consequently for ocean industries and coastal communities.

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This highlights not just a change in terminology but reflects a different understanding of what fisheries management needs to account for. Fish cannot be managed independently of the environmental system that determines where they are found, nor can fishing be considered independently of the other activities competing for the same ocean. The objective is to move beyond managing individual sectors in isolation towards coordinating activity as conditions change.

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The United Kingdom is moving in a related direction, although through a different institutional structure. Its Fisheries Management Plans increasingly incorporate environmental change and recognise the need for management to adapt as evidence develops. The Southern North Sea and Eastern Channel mixed-flatfish plan provides a useful example. It recognises that changing climatic conditions can alter the distribution of marine organisms and identifies the need to improve understanding of how environmental change will affect the fishery and what mitigation may be required. The significance is that climate-driven change is no longer simply an external consideration for fisheries policy; it is beginning to shape the management plans themselves.

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Neither country has solved the underlying problem, and their approaches are not identical. But their trajectories reveal an important shift in how fisheries are being understood. Governments are beginning to accept that fishing cannot be managed effectively by treating the biological system as static. The direction of travel is toward management that can account for environmental change, changing species distributions and increasing competition for marine space.

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The challenge now is less about recognising the need for new capability than about creating the conditions for that capability to be adopted. Much of the technological infrastructure required to make fisheries more responsive is already being developed by small technology companies, specialist engineering firms, data companies and emerging ventures capable of building and iterating much faster than traditional institutional procurement cycles allow. Governments should create the pathways for those capabilities to be tested, trusted and deployed before the conditions they are intended to address become more difficult to manage.

 

This is where the next phase of fisheries reform will be decided. Governments can accelerate innovation by making data and testing environments more accessible, creating faster routes for small companies to work with public institutions, and directing early funding towards the teams capable of developing and proving new approaches quickly. Rather than requiring emerging companies to navigate the same structures designed for large incumbents, procurement and funding mechanisms should give them a realistic path from prototype to operational deployment, with successful technologies able to progress rapidly once they demonstrate value.

 

This matters because speed is increasingly part of capability. A small team able to build, test and improve a system in months can respond to an emerging need very differently from an organisation whose development cycle is measured in years. The objective is not to replace the institutions and infrastructure that have built the modern understanding of the ocean. It is to make that infrastructure more open to the companies now capable of extending it, and to support the conditions under which innovation reaches the fishing industry. The current system cannot keep pace with the rate at which the oceans are changing.

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The missing infrastructure is not another database.

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The next generation of ocean technology should not simply digitise the institutions that already exist. Digitising a static process does not necessarily make that process adaptive. The value lies in the relationships between purpose-built datasets, and in creating intelligence that can continuously connect observations, models, human knowledge and decisions.

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Over the past two decades, enormous investment has gone into observing the marine environment: satellites, sensors, vessel tracking, oceanographic models and increasingly sophisticated monitoring systems. These capabilities have transformed what can be measured. This coincides with the global emergence of better computing and machine learning, which makes not only the interpretation of these datasets more efficient, but increasingly enables the interpolation of information across them and the extrapolation of potential scenarios. As a relational database grows you can start predicting outcomes and model risk. 

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This is why the next generation of marine technology is  less a collection of maps and more as a living spatial system. A system that can effectively incorporate new evidence, compares conditions over time, connects local observations with broader environmental signals, and exposes emerging relationships. Eventually, it can help the people responsible for making decisions understand not only what has happened but what is beginning to happen. 

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This is the difference between retrospective intelligence and anticipatory intelligence and as the ocean changes faster, closing that gap becomes increasingly important.

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The next ocean generation will build differently.

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Large institutions will continue to remain indispensable. Governments control policy. Scientific organisations produce foundational knowledge. Established ocean companies possess infrastructure and decades of operational experience. But none of those advantages automatically creates the ability to build software quickly. As the needs of ocean management change from static to adaptive there is a corresponding shift in the type of company capable of supplying the right tools. 

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The history of the ocean industry is full of companies that became highly capable at building the technologies that defined the previous generation of marine monitoring. Many of them are staffed by excellent engineers and scientists and have built much of the infrastructure on which the economy depends. Their position was reinforced by long-term contracts, established procurement relationships and systems embedded within particular jurisdictions and institutions. This created stability, but it also made the existing architecture difficult to challenge. With so much of the industry built around these established foundations, the companies that built the tools of the previous generation do not necessarily have the commercial incentives required to build the next one.

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Software companies operate differently because they have to. Their advantage comes from speed of iteration: build, deploy, learn, improve and repeat. The best engineering teams want to see their systems used, their code deployed and their products improve in response to real-world feedback. A development cycle measured in months creates fundamentally different possibilities from one measured in years.

Satellites, sensors, vessels and communications infrastructure will continue to generate the observations on which the ocean industry depends. But the value of those observations increasingly lies in what can be done with them and how it's turned into actionable, evidenceable decisions. Hardware produces observations whilst software increasingly determines how much intelligence can be extracted from them and how quickly that intelligence can improve.

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The result is an industry at risk of becoming mismatched with the problem it is being asked to solve. The ocean is becoming more dynamic, while much of the technology ecosystem supporting it remains organised around long development cycles and established ways of working. That is not a criticism of the engineers or institutions that built the existing system. It is a consequence of an industry that has had relatively little competitive pressure to operate differently.

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A new generation of ocean companies are valuable because they can operate under different constraints: smaller teams, faster development cycles, direct relationships with users and a willingness to build, test and discard approaches until something works. They can pursue problems that are too early, too specialised or too iterative for traditional procurement models to support.

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Governments should open data, testing environments and procurement pathways to these companies, and provide early funding where the private market is not yet willing to absorb the risk. The goal is to create a market in which the best technology can reach the fishing industry quickly rather than one in which the most established supplier wins by default.

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The bottom line is, if the ocean is changing faster than the industry can adapt, then the industry needs companies capable of changing faster too.

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Opening the flood gates. A collaboration shift. 

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If the mission is resilient fisheries, the starting point should not be which institution owns the data, maintains the system or controls the jurisdiction. It should be what needs to be understood, what decision needs to be made and what capability would make that decision better.

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That means opening the systems that already exist to the people developing what comes next. The difficulty is that the ocean is not organised around a single system of authority. Fisheries management, environmental monitoring, marine spatial planning, scientific research, vessel activity and seafood supply are notoriously governed through different institutions, jurisdictions and mandates, each with its own standards, priorities and boundaries. Those boundaries are necessary for institutions to function, but they do not correspond neatly to the biological and economic systems they are trying to manage. A fish stock can move between jurisdictions. A vessel can operate across management regimes. An environmental change can affect fisheries, conservation and offshore infrastructure simultaneously. Yet the information and decision-making systems around each remain largely organised according to who is responsible for what. There is little cross over which leaves room for duplication, confusion of ownership, and a resulting stalemate that inhibits action. 

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That makes coordination a capability in its own right. To make it easier for the people working across those boundaries to build, test and connect new capabilities. The next generation of ocean technology should be built around the problems that cross these boundaries, rather than reproducing the boundaries themselves. We caveat this, in that throughout this entire white paper, this was a key argument we couldn’t find clear resolutions to. The fragmentation of authority, funding and responsibility has been one of the most difficult problems to resolve. But we do believe it can start with encouragement for those leading institutions to construct stronger funding and collaboration agreements specifically integrating all tiers of companies and recruiting with a transdisciplinary domain objective to encourage coastal innovation rather than silo’d into jurisdictions. 

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The funding and the format needed. 

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Government has a unique role in creating the conditions in which new technology can be built and adopted as well. Today, too many blue technologies become trapped between prototypes and procurement. A company can demonstrate that something works, yet have no clear route to put it into sustained operational use. For a small company, that gap can be enough to kill a product before the market has had a chance to decide whether it is valuable.

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This gap also begins much earlier in the process. The ocean is a capital-intensive industry where most important technical ideas often require investment before there is an MVP to demonstrate and before conventional investors can see a clear commercial return. Government should expand exploratory funding that allows technically promising ideas to be tested before they are expected to look like conventional businesses. The purpose of this funding is not to sustain companies indefinitely, but to get good ideas far enough to generate the technical evidence, prototypes and early user validation that allow private capital to engage.

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The same logic applies once that technical risk has been reduced. If the UK uses public funding to help a company develop a technology, but UK venture capital is unwilling to fund its next stage of growth, that company may have little choice but to look overseas for the capital, customers and partnerships it needs to scale. The UK can therefore end up paying to de-risk companies at the earliest stage, only to see the economic value of that investment mature elsewhere. That means we need to create a domestic venture capital market willing to back ambitious companies beyond the grant stage and on more agile, early stage approaches to ocean innovation. 

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Beyond funding, there is the challenge of testing R&D in ocean conditions with key stakeholders that will eventually convert to paying customers. The answer is not more pilots for the sake of more pilots. It is to create opportunities to build with the people who will actually use the technology. Fishermen should be involved from the beginning, not asked to validate a finished system at the end. They understand the practical constraints of working at sea better than any procurement specification can. They also bear the cost when new technology creates additional reporting, surveys or equipment without delivering something useful in return.

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Fishermen are also already asked to contribute significant amounts of information to regulators, scientists and other organisations. If every new project creates another survey, another reporting requirement or another piece of equipment to maintain, the system becomes increasingly burdensome while the information remains fragmented. New technology should work in the opposite direction to capture information through existing activity, return useful intelligence to the people providing it, and make each additional interaction more valuable.

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That is how the government can help create a market rather than simply fund innovation. By opening access to vessels, data and operational environments, funding early deployments and creating procurement pathways an ecosystem is created where successful technologies can move directly from demonstration into use. A successful deployment gives the industry evidence that a technology works, gives investors confidence that there is a customer for it, and gives the company the experience needed to build a product that can scale. The role of government is to help create the first conditions for that cycle to begin. 

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The economic picture is larger than fisheries.

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Fisheries provide one of the clearest examples between environmental change and immediate economic returns. But the underlying problem exists throughout the ocean economy.

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Aquaculture depends upon environmental conditions. Offshore energy depends upon spatial planning and environmental assessment. Shipping depends upon predictable operating conditions. Seafood processors depend upon the reliability of supply. Insurers need to understand physical exposure. Investors increasingly need to understand how environmental change translates into commercial risk. Governments need evidence capable of supporting decisions over infrastructure, conservation and food security.

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In each case, the economic systems that depend upon the ocean need to understand precise climate changes quickly enough to respond. This is why ocean intelligence should ultimately be understood as infrastructure. It is not merely another source of environmental data. It is the connective layer between environmental change and economic decision-making.

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SeaVoice. Our take on this. 

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A fishing vessel is already generating information through the work it does every day, yet much of that information remains difficult to capture and connect to the wider systems used to understand the marine environment. Reporting, vessel activity, environmental conditions and regulatory constraints are often treated as separate processes. SeaVoice is designed to bring them together around the activity already taking place on the vessel. In the most literal sense, SeaVoice got its name as the tone embedded in spoken work carries rich context, perspective, and history. The way fishermen operate provides an incredible depth far more informative than simply their catch stats upon return to port. We want to integrate that without asking them to change the way they work whilst respecting their privacy and rights to go about operations without a ‘seeing eye.’ 

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In addition, a fisherman should not have to become a data administrator in order for the wider system to learn from what happens at sea. Information can be captured through the fisher's existing workflow, structured and georeferenced, while relevant environmental and regulatory information can be brought back into the same interaction. The objective is to make participation useful to the person providing the information, rather than treating the fisher simply as a source of data. 

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Value increases as vessel catch data increases specifically when it can be understood alongside observations from satellite imagery, oceanographic models, vessel activity and regulatory geography. The resulting picture is no longer a record of what individual vessels reported. It begins to describe relationships across the fishery: where environmental conditions are changing, where species are being observed, how fishing activity is responding and where regulatory or spatial pressures are emerging.

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For fishermen, this can mean better information about changing conditions and where and when to operate. For the wider seafood economy, it creates earlier visibility into changes in where, when and how much fish is being caught. That can help companies and investors identify emerging supply risks earlier, improve forecasting and make better decisions about where capital is exposed to changing fisheries. For nature and climate finance, the same information can provide a more direct view of how environmental change is translating into real activity at sea. Capturing this information through normal operations, rather than adding another layer of surveys and reporting, means the system becomes more useful as it grows without increasing the burden on the people generating the data.

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SeaVoice is not important because it is an AI reporting tool, or because it combines satellite data with fisheries information.  Its significance is that it demonstrates how a new generation of marine technology can connect the operational reality of the fishing vessel with the broader systems used to understand the ocean and operate with resilience. It’s a response to a structural change that is already underway.

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The window is now.​

 

There is a tendency to treat adaptation as something that happens after a system has failed. That is a dangerous way to approach the ocean. Marine ecosystems and species distributions are changing, management arrangements are coming under pressure, and the ocean is becoming more contested, while the information needed to understand these changes remains fragmented across institutions and industries.

 

The cost is already visible: vessels travelling further to find productive grounds, duplicated data collection and decisions made with information that no longer reflects conditions at sea. The problem is not simply a lack of data. It is the failure to turn the data we already have into timely, usable intelligence. As the ocean changes, the cost of that gap will only increase.

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This is not an argument for abandoning the science, institutions or knowledge that built the modern fishing industry. Historical data and environmental assessment will remain essential alongside the regulation and jurisdictions that manage our coasts. But none of them can operate effectively in isolation from the changing system they are trying to understand.

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The next generation of ocean technology will need to connect them. It will need to move faster, be provided the correct funding mechanisms and make better use of the information already being produced. It will need companies capable of building technology at the speed at which the problem is changing.

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The oceans have changed and the institutions and industries that built the infrastructure to know this are now pressured to adapt. For generations, we built systems around the ocean we knew. The next generation will have to build systems around the ocean we are entering.

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Supporting References

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[1] Reid, P.C. et al. (2005). Synchronous ecological regime shifts in the central Baltic and the North Sea in the late 1980s. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 62(7), 1205–1215.
Evidence for the late-1980s North Sea regime shift, including changes across phytoplankton, zooplankton and fish populations, and links to the North Atlantic Oscillation and increased Atlantic inflow.

https://academic.oup.com/icesjms/article/62/7/1205/654639

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[2] Gullestad, P., Sundby, S. & Kjesbu, O.S. (2020). Management of transboundary and straddling fish stocks in the Northeast Atlantic in view of climate-induced shifts in spatial distribution. Fish and Fisheries, 21, 1005–1026.
Key source for the argument that climate-driven stock redistribution is challenging management arrangements based on historical catch distributions, particularly for Northeast Atlantic mackerel and Norwegian spring-spawning herring.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12485

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[3] Government of Norway (2024). Norway's Integrated Ocean Management Plans: Meld. St. 21 (2023–2024). Ministry of Climate and Environment.
Primary source for Norway's ecosystem-based ocean-management approach, climate impacts on Norwegian waters, changes in fish stocks and zooplankton distribution, and the growing importance of spatial management.

https://www.regjeringen.no/en/documents/meld.-st.-21-20232024/id3032474/ 

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[4] UK Government (2024). Fisheries Management Plan for North Sea and Eastern Channel Mixed Flatfish.
Primary source for the UK evidence on warming-driven changes in fish distribution and abundance, including the finding that 72% of 50 abundant fish species around the UK and Ireland had responded to regional warming.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/southern-north-sea-and-eastern-channel-mixed-flatfish-fisheries-management-plan-fmp/fisheries-management-plan-for-north-sea-and-eastern-channel-mixed-flatfish